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I
n the last issue of Region
Focus, I discussed some of
the problems that could
result from Federal Reserve 
support to troubled financial
institutions. In particular, I
argued that such support, if not
done properly, could encourage
institutions to take on risks that
they otherwise would avoid.
This, of course, is the issue of
moral hazard, and it should
remain in the forefront of the
minds of policymakers as the economy recovers from the
current financial upheaval.
But that raises an interesting issue: How can central
banks assist distressed financial institutions without induc-
ing undesirable future behavior by those institutions? 
In short, how can the Fed act effectively as the lender of last
resort?
There is no precise answer to those questions. When the
Fed intervenes in the market, its actions often have effects
that could not have been perfectly forecast. Policymakers
rely on economic science to guide their decisions, but 
policymaking itself is not an exact science. Instead, it is a
complicated exercise that often requires people to act on
incomplete information, using the best data and theory
available to form decisions.
Such theory is often new work done by leading contem-
porary economists. But not always. There are times when
policymakers can learn much from the writings of the clas-
sical economists. I think that the current situation is such
an instance.
Writing in the 19th century, Henry Thornton and later
Walter Bagehot offered thoughtful advice as to how the
Bank of England could act effectively as the lender of 
last resort. As my former colleague Thomas Humphrey 
has written, the Thornton-Bagehot framework stressed six
key points:
•Protecting the aggregate money stock, not 
individual institutions. 
• Letting insolvent institutions fail.
• Accommodating only sound institutions.
• Charging penalty rates.
• Requiring good collateral.
• Preannouncing these conditions well in advance 
of any crisis so that the market would know what 
to expect.
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This, I believe, is a good place for modern central
bankers to start when they think about how to lend to trou-
bled institutions. If the Fed is going to make funds available,
it should do so with the primary goal of protecting sound
institutions and the financial industry as a whole. It should
not attempt to save every institution. The optimal level of
failure in any industry is not zero, and that includes the
financial industry.
This is often a fine line to walk. There are cases where it
is difficult to know in advance how much collateral damage
would result if an institution were to fail. But if the rules 
of the game are spelled out clearly and the market believes
the Fed will stick to those rules, then banks will have a
strong incentive to avoid putting themselves in situations
where they must come to the Fed to borrow at above-
market rates. Moreover, banks will seek to protect them-
selves against a sudden loss of access to liquidity, promoting 
efficiency and stability in the financial system.    
We are going through what is, in many ways, an unprece-
dented period in American economic and financial history.
Economists and policymakers — and I count myself among
both groups — do not know exactly why the financial sector
has encountered such disruptions recently, although many
plausible hypotheses have been proposed. More to the
point, however, we do not know exactly how to most effec-
tively help that sector get through this period. The best we
can do is to rely on sound theory, data, and judgment to not
only restore the health of the financial sector but also to
avoid similar upheaval in the future. In this case, I believe
that means drawing upon some longstanding principles
about central bank policy. They do not provide all the
answers, but they do provide a framework that should 
prove very useful to the Fed and other central banks around
the world.
 